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Summary
The banking system in Uganda is among the weakest in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Its liabilities
comprise less than 10 per cent of GDP, it is highly oligopolistic and inefficient in performing
many basic banking functions, and the largest bank and several smaller banks are insolvent.
The financial policies of the pre-reform period aimed to control banking markets, ostensibly
for developmental and other non commercial objectives.  These policies had very damaging
effects on the banking system.  Financial repression deterred the public from holding bank
deposits.  A large government owned bank was operated with very little regard for
commercial principals and accumulated a massive portfolio of bad debts as a result.  The role
of the foreign banks, which at least provided a basic, if limited, range of banking services,
was sharply curtailed when they sold most of their branches to the public sector banks.  The
neglect of prudential regulation allowed mismanagement to become widespread, not just in
the government banks but also among some of the newer banks established in the late 1980s
by the private sector.
The financial sector reforms of the 1990s are intended to remedy the consequences of the
previous two decades of misguided financial policies.  The second contention of this paper is
that these objectives are likely to prove very difficult to attain because of the scale of the
problems which the banking sector inherited from the pre-reform era, and especially because
of the dominant market position of the public sector banks.
The author is a former IDS Research Officer.  At the time of publication (June 1996) he was working for
UNCTAD (Division for Least Developed Countries) in Geneva, Switzerland.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The banking system in Uganda is among the weakest in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Its liabilities
comprise less than 10 per cent of GDP, it is highly oligopolistic and inefficient in performing
many basic banking functions, and the largest bank and several smaller banks are insolvent.
The problems of the banking system are attributable to the financial policies pursued by
successive governments between the mid 1960s and the late 1980s, combined with the severe
economic crisis, civil conflicts and acute political instability, which afflicted Uganda during
this period.  Since 1991 the government has begun implementing financial sector reforms
with the objective of redressing these weaknesses.  The reforms include the liberalisation of
financial markets, restructuring distressed banks and strengthening prudential regulation.
The financial policies of the pre-reform period aimed to control banking markets, ostensibly
for developmental and other non commercial objectives.  One of the contentions of this paper
is that these policies had very damaging effects on the banking system.  Financial repression
deterred the public from holding bank deposits.  A large government owned bank was
operated with very little regard for commercial principals and accumulated a massive
portfolio of bad debts as a result.  The role of the foreign banks, which at least provided a
basic, if limited, range of banking services, was sharply curtailed when they sold most of their
branches to the public sector banks.  The neglect of prudential regulation allowed
mismanagement to become widespread, not just in the government banks but also among
some of the newer banks established in the late 1980s by the private sector.
The financial sector reforms of the 1990s are intended to remedy the consequences of the
previous two decades of misguided financial policies; in particular to boost deposit
mobilisation, stimulate competition and enhance efficiency in financial markets, tackle
financial distress and ensure prudent management of banks.  The second contention of this
paper is that these objectives are likely to prove very difficult to attain because of the scale of
the problems which the banking sector inherited from the pre-reform era, and especially
because of the dominant market position of the public sector banks.
                    
1 The author thanks Charles Harvey, IDS, for invaluable comments on the first draft of this paper but
takes responsibility for all remaining errors.
3The main part of this paper is organised in two sections, the first discusses the pre-reform
financial policies and their impact on the banking industry and the second evaluates the
financial reforms of the 1990s.  The paper focuses mainly on the problems of the public
sector banks and the measures now underway to restructure them, prudential regulation and
its reform, the effects of interest rate controls on banking and the efficacy of interest rate
liberalisation.  It also discusses the role in the banking industry played by the foreign banks
and the new local private sector banks.  The rest of this introduction provides a very brief
background to economic developments and policies in Uganda during the post independence
period in order to place the discussion in the subsequent sections in perspective.
Uganda suffered a prolonged economic decline from around 1970 until 1986 as a result of
mismanagement and intermittent civil war.  Real GDP per capita fell by 38 per cent over this
period.  The economy was subject to extensive administrative controls over foreign exchange,
imports, financial markets and agricultural prices, etc., which led to acute distortions and the
shrinkage of the formal and monetised economy.  The collapse of the public revenue base led
to large public deficits, the financing of which by the Central Bank caused very high rates of
inflation.  The country was also denuded of skilled personnel as a result of war, the expulsion
in the early 1970s of Ugandan Asians, and more recently AIDs.
In 1986 the National Resistance Movement (NRM) seized power, restored security to most of
the country and set about reviving the economy, with much success.  Real GDP growth has
since averaged 6 per cent per annum.  A stabilisation programme was adopted in 1987
supported by the IMF, World Bank and donors, with the initial emphasis on devaluation,
increased producer prices for farmers, and fiscal and monetary restraint.  Many of the
administrative controls on the economy were subsequently liberalised, including those on
foreign exchange markets, and in 1991 the government adopted a financial sector adjustment
programme which entailed financial liberalisation and institutional reforms.
2 FINANCIAL POLICIES IN THE PRE-REFORM PERIOD
The commercial banks operating in Uganda at independence - Barclays, Standard, ANZ
Grindlays and Bank of Baroda - were foreign owned.  As in many other newly independent
African countries, there was discontent over the lending policies of these banks and a belief
that government intervention was necessary to ensure that the banking system played a more
supportive role in the development of the economy.  Consequently successive governments
adopted interventionist policies towards the banking sector after the country gained
independence.  Interest rates were controlled, public sector banks were set up, the government
purchased shares in the foreign banks, and a variety of administered lending programmes
were established.
4This section examines the impact of these policies on banking markets.  Sub-section 2.1
discusses interest rate policy and its effect on financial depth (i.e. the holding of financial
assets).  The role and performance of the public sector banks is assessed in Sub-section 2.2.
Sub-section 2.3 deals with foreign banks and the following sub-section with the growth, since
the mid 1980s, of local private sector banks.  Prudential regulation is discussed in Sub-section
2.5 and this is followed by a brief summary of the conclusions of the section.
2.1 INTEREST RATES
The level and structure of interest rates were determined by the Central Bank, the Bank of
Uganda (BOU) until 1992.  Nominal interest rates were held well below the rate of inflation
for most of the 1970s and 1980s.  Annual consumer price inflation was high during the 1970s
and 1980s, fuelled by monetary financing of large government deficits.  Inflation averaged
103 per cent during 1981-90, while nominal lending rates for commerce averaged 31 per cent
and time deposit rates 24 per cent (see Table 1).2  Consequently real interest rates were
substantially negative on average, although there were wide annual fluctuations because,
while adjustments to the administered nominal interest rates were generally small, the
inflation rate displayed considerable instability.3
Negative real returns on monetary assets contributed to the steep decline in the financial depth
of the Ugandan Economy.  Between 1970 and 1990 the M2/GDP ratio fell from 18 per cent to
7 per cent while the share of bank deposits in M2 fell from 65 per cent to 59 per cent (see
Table 2).  The attractiveness of bank deposits for the Ugandan public was further eroded
because the banks operated a very inefficient payments system, hence cash was needed to
effect most transactions (Harvey 1993:  1).  Unsurprisingly in view of the chronic instability
in real returns, the holding of long term financial assets by the public was negligible.
Although the severe financial shallowing in Uganda was partly attributable to developments
exogenous to the banking system - the share of monetised output in GDP declined as a result
of acute security problems and unattractive producer prices paid to farmers - it is clear that
sustained financial repression had very damaging consequences for the banking system.
Public confidence in the holding of financial assets is also likely to have been undermined by
the demonetisation exercise in 1987, which imposed a tax of 30 per cent on holdings of
currency and bank deposits as well as some other financial assets in an attempt to reduce
                    
2 Data on inflation rates in the 1970s are not readily available.
3 Although fiscal deficits were the principal cause of the inflation, monetary policy does not appear to
have been particularly restrictive until the SAP was introduced in 1987 and credit ceilings were
imposed on the banks as part of the stabilisation measures.  Apart from interest rate controls (which
were clearly useless as a macroeconomic tool given that they were set at levels far too low to clear the
market), the main instrument of monetary policy was the cash reserve requirement (set at 10 per cent of
deposit liabilities until 1993), but the effectiveness of this was undermined because banks had
automatic access to BOU lending facilities whenever they faced liquidity constraints (Musinguzi 1995:
37).
5liquidity in the economy, although most of the damage in terms of the reduction in financial
depth of the economy had already occurred by this point.
2.2 PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS
Two public sector banks were established in the period following independence:  The Uganda
Commercial Bank (UCB) was set up in 1965 as the successor to the Savings and Credit Bank
and this was followed in 1972 by the Cooperative Bank.  Both were expected to fulfil
developmental objectives, ignored basic commercial principles, and incurred huge losses
from bad debts.
The objectives of the UCB were to provide credit for indigenous businesses and to facilitate
government development programmes, although the emphasis of its operations changed with
the priorities of different governments.  Its lending policies were heavily influenced by the
government and some of its programmes - onlending government and donor funds with
medium term maturities - were more suitable for a development bank than a commercial
bank.  From the mid 1960s the government established a variety of administered agricultural
and rural lending schemes; one of the latest being the UCB rural farmers scheme of 1987-93.
As the UCB and Cooperative banks were the only banks with branches in the rural areas after
the early 1970s they were the obvious vehicles for operating these schemes.
In 1971/72 the parastatal sector was expanded when many of the Asian and other foreign
owned businesses were nationalised:  UCB became the banker to this sector.  Its branch
network expanded rapidly in the early 1970s as result of it taking over most of the branches of
the foreign owned banks.  The acquisition of these branches left UCB, along with the much
smaller Cooperative Bank, with a monopoly in banking markets virtually everywhere outside
of Kampala.  The removal of Amin in 1979 brought a revival of foreign development
assistance to Uganda, some of which was channelled through UCB, which led to an increase
in the share of medium term financing in its loan portfolio.  It was also used to perform a
variety of functions for the government in the rural areas:  for example, taxes and school fees
were paid into its branches.
During the late 1980s the UCB undertook a major rural expansion programme, opening 130
new branches and further extending its financing of agricultural investment.  Given the acute
shortages of professional skills in Uganda this rapid expansion must have even further
undermined the bank’s managerial efficiency and internal controls.  By the early 1990s the
UCB held around 50 per cent of commercial bank deposits and had 190 of the 237 bank
branches in the country (see Table 3).
6The Cooperative Bank, which had the second largest branch network with 24 branches, was
owned by the cooperative societies which were themselves major borrowers of the bank.  It
would have been difficult for the bank to refuse to extend credit to the cooperatives, even
though many were badly managed and not creditworthy.
The availability of automatic liquidity support from the BOU and the lack of proper
accounting procedures allowed the imprudent management of UCB and the Cooperative
Bank, and the consequent losses incurred, to continue unchecked until the early 1990s.  Both
banks were by then insolvent.  The UCB’s non performing loans accounted for around 75 per
cent of its total loan portfolio.  The accumulation of such a huge volume of non performing
loans was attributable mainly to the political influence on its lending policies, exacerbated by
very poor loan procedures and corruption.  Loan recovery rates on the administered lending
schemes were below 50 per cent.  Because of the political nature of these schemes, the UCB
failed to adequately appraise or monitor these loans or to pursue their recovery.  Repayment
discipline on the part of borrowers was low because they often regarded such loans as
reparations for war damage or rewards for political support, while in some instances
politicians told their constituents that loans from government banks need not be repaid
(Nsereko 1995:  28-29).  UCB also appears to have suffered from widespread corruption,
although the evidence is largely anecdotal:  politicians and politically connected borrowers
appear to have been able to access loans, to have failed to repay them and then to have
successfully lobbied against the bank taking action to recover the loans.
Although the protracted economic crisis, disruption from war and the weak legal system made
the lending climate for the banks in Uganda very difficult and undoubtedly made some
contribution to the bad debts of UCB and the Cooperative Bank, the scale of this problem
indicates that the primary cause was their lending practises rather than exogenous factors.
The foreign banks also faced a difficult lending climate and did accumulate some bad debts,
but these were nowhere near the level of those of the UCB and the Cooperative Bank.4
Sustained operating losses also contributed to UCB’s financial problems:  until 1995 it had
not made an operating profit for seven years.  The large size of its branch network, high
staffing levels, the provision of non banking services for the government referred to above,
the deficiencies of the rural infrastructure, and inefficient management boosted its operating
costs.  The UCB’s wage bill alone exceeded its income in the early 1990s (The New Vision
1995:  11 (8):  31).
                    
4 See Sub-section 2.3 below.
72.3 FOREIGN BANKS
The dominance of the foreign banks was sharply reduced in the 1970s.  The Amin regime
compulsorily purchased 49 per cent equity stakes in three of the banks in the early 1970s
(Standard Bank was the exception).  It also closed all but one of Standard’s 15 branches:
these were later taken over by the Cooperative Bank.  Most of the branches of Barclays Bank
and Grindlays were sold to UCB later in the 1970s (Harvey 1993:  5-6).  As a result the
foreign banks no longer have a nation-wide branch network:  Standard and Stanbic (a South
African bank which bought out Grindlays’ shares in 1992) now have only a single branch each
and Barclays three.5  The foreign banks’ operations are mainly confined to Kampala and their
share of commercial bank deposits has fallen to 30 per cent.6  Their asset management has
remained conservative:  their liquidity ratios have been high and their lending has generally
been concentrated on the larger companies, on trade finance and syndicated loans to the crop
marketing boards to finance crop purchasing.
The loans to crop marketing boards, principally the Coffee Marketing Board (CMB),
comprised a major share of bank lending to the non government sector by the foreign banks
and the UCB:  in the late 1980s the overdrafts of the CMB comprised over 20 per cent of all
commercial bank lending.  From the banks’ point of view this lending was safe, as it was
secured by the CMB’s holdings of coffee stocks.7  The foreign banks also lent to some of the
better managed cooperative unions in the late 1980s.
Not surprisingly in view of the economic problems in the country, the foreign banks have
made only modest profits.  Recorded profits would probably have been lower had stricter
accounting standards been applied in respect of the treatment of non performing loans.
Barclays suffered a heavy loss in 1994 as a result of having to make extensive provisions for
non performing loans to comply with the requirements of the newly enacted Financial
Institutions Statute.8  However the foreign banks have made sufficient profits to avoid serious
distress with the exception of the Tropical Africa Bank.  Apart from Stanbic, the foreign
                    
5 Stanbic purchased ANZ Grindlays’ subsidiaries in several African countries.  The main reason for its
investment in Uganda is to provide corporate finance, especially to South African companies investing
in, or trading with, Uganda.
6 A fifth foreign bank - the Libyan Arab Bank for Trade and Development - was established in 1972 as a
joint venture with the government but its share of the banking market is negligible.  Since 1994 it has
been called the Tropical Africa Bank.
7 The CMB was itself acting as a financial intermediary, onlending between 25 per cent and 50 per cent
of its commercial bank loans to cooperatives, private processors and other marketing boards.  The
CMB did not have the expertise to allocate credit efficiently and it is likely that much of the funds that
it on lent were wasted.  Some of the loans extended to cooperatives for the purpose of buying coffee
were diverted into investments which were commercially unsuccessful.
8 Barclays had made provisions for 25 per cent of its lending portfolio in 1994.  Standard and Stanbic
had made lower levels of provisions.
8banks have shown little inclination to reinvest in Uganda, to re-establish rural branches or to
introduce any innovative services since the country began liberalising its economy in 1987.
2.4 LOCAL PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS
During the second half of the 1980s and the early 1990s nine banks were established by local
private sector investors, mainly business people with interests in trading, manufacturing,
agriculture and real estate.  Some of the locally owned private sector banks (henceforth local
banks) originated as credit institutions before later converting to banks.  Most of the local
banks are still relatively small, although the largest, Nile Bank, had captured 8.3 per cent of
commercial bank deposits by 1993.  The local banks’ lending is mainly short term and
focused on traders and manufacturers.  Most have only two or three branches located in the
main cities.
The poor standard of services offered by the established public sector and foreign banks
created an opportunity for the new banks to win customers by, for example, offering longer
opening hours and a greater willingness to serve the credit needs of small scale businesses.
Given the abundance of low denomination notes in circulation, some of the local banks were
able to speed up transactions with customers, and therefore cut the time customers spent
waiting in queues in banking halls, by installing note counting machines and by accepting
cash deposits at the customers’ valuation, with the notes counted and discrepancies reconciled
later.
The local banks have faced a number of difficulties in establishing their presence in the
banking market.  Liquidity is tight because of the shallow depth of the financial system in
Uganda and because the interbank market is not developed.  There is a shortage of suitable
collateral other than real estate in Kampala.  Loan recovery is hard because of weaknesses and
delays in the courts and because the property market is depressed.  There are severe scarcities
of qualified and experienced staff.
Four of the local private sector banks have run into financial distress during the last few
years.  The BOU, using its newly acquired powers under the 1993 Financial Institutions
Statute, closed down the Tieffe Bank in 1994, and in April 1995 it took over the Nile and
Sembule Banks, suspending their boards of directors and management and appointing new
chief executives to implement restructuring plans.  These banks were insolvent and required
large overdrafts from the BOU to remain liquid.  A fourth local bank, the Centenary Rural
Trust Bank, is being restructured with foreign assistance.  The measures being implemented
to restructure these banks are discussed further in Section 3.2 below:  the remainder of this
section concentrates on the causes of their financial distress.
9The financial fragility of the local banks was largely the result of bad debts arising from
imprudent credit practices, especially insider lending (mainly to the other businesses owned
by the shareholders), lending without proper security, and very weak internal controls.  Non
performing loans accounted for two thirds of the loan book of one of the banks currently
being restructured, while insider lending accounted for almost 50 per cent of its total loans.
This bank’s record keeping was very poor and it had issued around Sh4 billion of contingent
liabilities (amounting to more than 50 per cent of its deposits) without any proper records
having been kept.
Prudent management in the distressed banks was impeded because managers and boards of
directors lacked sufficient banking experience and because there was too little separation
between the roles of managers and owners, hence the pressure to extend loans to the
businesses of the latter.  The banks were also severely undercapitalised, in part because of the
acute shortages of capital and absence of capital markets in Uganda.9
2.5 PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
Prudential regulation and supervision were not accorded much emphasis by the government
and BOU during the pre-reform period.  The 1969 Banking Act, which provided the
legislative framework for the banking industry, contained numerous deficiencies (these are
discussed in more detail in Section 3.2 below which deals with the reforms to prudential
regulation).  Supervisory capacities in the BOU were too weak for it to effectively discharge
many of the functions it was assigned under the Act.  The bank returns provided to the BOU
were inadequate for off site inspection, and the information they did contain was sometimes
not collated and analysed by the BOU, while on site inspections were not conducted regularly.
Differences in auditing practises among the banks also complicated the task of supervision.
The UCB was able to consistently ignore regulations, such as the liquidity ratios, while the
BOU’s willingness to accommodate the credit needs of illiquid banks further undermined
incentives for bank managers to improve performance.
The consequences of ineffective prudential regulation became even more acute with the
growth of the local banks discussed in the preceding section.  Legislative weaknesses
contributed to the fragility which afflicted some of these banks.  Most were severely
undercapitalised, having been set up in the late 1980s and early 1990s when minimum capital
requirements were worth very little.  The minimum capital requirement was only Sh200,000
in 1988 (equivalent to only $2,000 at the time).10  It was subsequently raised to Sh20 million
                    
9 The paid up capital of the Nile Bank amounted to only $200,000 in 1993.
10 The minimum capital requirement had been set at Sh2 million in the 1969 Banking Act.  It remained at
the same level, despite the huge increase in the price level and in 1987 it was reduced to Sh200,000 in
line with the currency reform which removed one of the zeros from the currency.
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but, but with further rapid inflation and exchange rate depreciation, this was equivalent to less
than $30,000 in 1991.  The local banks were given banking licenses by the Minister of
Finance, clearly, in the light of subsequent events, without proper consideration having been
given to the expertise of managers and directors.  The 1969 Banking Act did not impose clear
restrictions on insider lending.  Had the BOU undertaken regular bank inspections and
possessed the legal authority to force banks to improve management, lending practises and
internal controls, some of the losses incurred by these banks may have been prevented.11
2.6 SUMMARY
The impact of government controls on financial markets and participation in banking was
disastrous.  There was a steep decline in the financial depth of the economy, and a marked
deterioration in the institutional strength of the banking system.  The banking system was
dominated by the UCB which held 50 per cent of the total deposits of all the commercial
banks and had a near monopoly everywhere other than in Kampala.  This led to a massive
misallocation of resources.  The UCB was bankrupted, mainly as a result of politically
influenced lending, but also because of corruption and excessive operating expenses, and
required regular loans from the BOU to remain liquid.  By the end of the 1980s financial
intermediation was peripheral to large sections of the economy, banking services were very
poor outside Kampala, huge losses were being incurred by the public sector banks and
effectively being financed through monetary creation, and the legislative and institutional
framework for prudential supervision was seriously deficient.
3 FINANCIAL REFORMS
The financial sector reform programme was begun in 1991 with the support of a World Bank
financial sector adjustment credit.  It has three major elements:  institutional reforms to the
BOU and the public sector banks, legislative changes to the banking laws and the BOU Act,
and financial liberalisation.  As with financial reform programmes elsewhere in Africa, it has
several interrelated objectives including strengthening techniques of monetary control,
boosting deposit mobilisation, stimulating competition in financial markets, enhancing the
efficiency with which financial services are provided and financial resources allocated,
restructuring insolvent banks, improving prudential regulation and supervision and promoting
the diversification of financial markets.  In this paper we are concerned with those aspects of
the reforms which most directly relate to the banking sector, in particular those aimed at
restructuring insolvent banks, strengthening the prudential framework and enhancing the
efficiency of banking markets.  Sub-section 3.1 examines the restructuring and the future role
                    
11 Many of the problems in Sembule Bank were uncovered in 1993 when the bank was inspected by the
BOU, but the recommendations contained in the inspector’s report were never carried out by Sembule’s
management.
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of the public sector banks, Sub-section 3.2 details the reforms to prudential regulation and the
Central Bank’s response to the financial distress which has emerged in some of the local
banks, and Sub-section 3.3 addresses the question of whether financial liberalisation will
enhance allocative efficiency in banking markets.
3.1 RESTRUCTURING PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS
A major restructuring programme for the UCB was initiated in 1992, financed by a $100
million World Bank loan, with the objective of restoring the bank to commercial viability.
The main requirements of this exercise are fourfold:  first, restructuring the UCB’s balance
sheet to restore the bank to solvency; second, reducing operating costs to prevent further
operating losses; third, re-organising lending procedures and internal controls to ensure that
bad debts incurred from new lending are kept to acceptable levels; and fourth, insulating the
bank from political pressure to compromise commercial principles.
Restructuring the UCB’s balance sheet is relatively straightforward but expensive.  A Non
Performing Assets Recovery Trust (NPART) was established in 1995 to which UCB’s non
performing loans will be transferred.12  NPART has been given extensive legal powers to
pursue recovery of these bad debts, although it must be doubtful if most will ever be
recovered.  In return for the transfer of the non performing loans, UCB will receive
government bonds with a face value equivalent to the loans transferred.13  The government
also injected almost Sh10 billion (approximately $10 million) of additional equity capital into
UCB.  Hence the cost of restructuring UCB’s balance sheet - not taking into account any loans
which might be recovered by NPART - will amount to approximately Sh90 billion (around
Sh80 billion of non performing loans plus the capital injection):  this is equivalent to about
$100 million or about 2 per cent of GDP.
Substantial progress has been made in reducing the UCB’s operating costs since 1993.  By
mid 1995 staffing levels had been reduced by 48 per cent, while the branch network, which
had totalled 190 branches, has been cut to 85 branches plus 53 agencies.  As a consequence
UCB was able to reduce operating expenses by about 25 per cent in nominal terms and
generated an operating profit in 1994/95.14  The management of UCB has been reorganised
with the appointment of a new board of directors and foreign technical advisors to the senior
management.
                    
12 The non performing loans were due to be transferred in November 1995.
13 The precise value of the loans to be transferred to UCB was not known in August 1995 because it had
not been decided whether non performing loans for which provisions had been made would be
transferred or not.
14 The operating profit did not take account of depreciation or provisions for non performing loans:  data
from The New Vision (11/8/95).
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Ensuring that the bad debt problem does not recur in the future may prove more problematic.
The reorganisation of UCB includes measures to rationalise its loan appraisal and monitoring
procedures, while accounting practices have been revised in line with the requirements of the
new banking law.  But even if political pressure to extend loans on non commercial criteria
can be avoided, building up a portfolio of sound loans will be difficult.  The number of
creditworthy borrowers in the economy is not large, and many of them borrow from the
foreign banks rather than UCB.  Loan appraisal and monitoring are impeded by shortages of
qualified staff, by high transactions costs in the rural areas, and by the lack of adequate
accounting standards among prospective borrowers.  Foreclosing on defaulters is difficult
because of the deficiencies of the legal system.  Preventing future bad debt problems will
almost certainly mean that UCB’s loan portfolio will be much smaller than in the past.
UCB must also be insulated from political pressure if it is to be run on strictly commercial
lines.  The government’s current intentions, following World Bank advice, are to privatise
UCB as soon as possible, although the modalities for this have not been decided.  Even with
its balance sheet restructured, UCB does not appear to be a very attractive investment for the
private sector.  Its rural network will probably be at best marginally profitable and whoever
does buy UCB will have to inject considerable managerial resources into the bank to protect
their investment.  Most of the major foreign banks operating in Africa are now much less
interested in retail banking than in the past:  their current focus is on corporate banking, for
which UCB’s structure would be redundant.  If a buyer is found it is likely that they would
want to further retrench its branch network and staff, and narrow the scope of its lending.
There is likely to be considerable political resistance, if this leads, as seems inevitable, to a
marked reduction in access to credit and other banking services in the rural areas.  UCB runs
the payments system in the rural areas (albeit inefficiently and unreliably), so that a large
scale withdrawal from rural areas would necessitate establishing an alternative structure for
payments.  It may be possible for the Post Office to provide basic savings and money transfer
facilities as an alternative to the UCB.
The Cooperative Bank is also being restructured, has retrenched staff and has been divested
from the cooperative unions.  It is being recapitalised with money generated from sales of US
food aid.15  In addition its liabilities to the government arising from administered loan
schemes will be written off.
3.2 STRENGTHENING PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
Strengthening the legislative and institutional framework for the prudential regulation of
financial markets has involved enacting new legislation to replace the 1969 Banking Act and
                    
15 The Cooperative Bank will receive Sh13 billion (about $13 million) from sales of food aid, provided
that certain conditions are fulfilled.
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upgrading supervisory capacities in the BOU.  The 1969 Banking Act had become outdated
and its provisions were deficient in many respects.  The authority to license banks lay with the
Minister of Finance rather than the BOU.  The BOU also required Ministry of Finance
permission before taking action related to prudential matters.  Minimum capital requirements
were too low, having been eroded by inflation.  The Act failed to delineate appropriate
prudential requirements to be followed by banks:  instead it specified a number of allocative
requirements.  It was also inflexible:  the BOU found it difficult to implement without having
recourse to the courts, nor was it able to issue prudential guidelines to the banks where
appropriate.
The 1993 Financial Institutions Statute rectified most of these legislative defects.  In addition
to banks, the statute covers credit institutions, building societies and development finance
institutions, bringing all these financial institutions under the supervisory authority of the
BOU.  It gives the BOU more independence from the Minister of Finance in licensing and
regulating financial institutions, although rejected applicants have the right of appeal to the
Minister who also must be consulted before prudential regulations are issued and before the
BOU liquidates insolvent financial institutions.  It is also more flexible than the 1969 Act in
that it gives the BOU the authority to issue prudential regulations pertaining to capital
adequacy, liquidity, data to be supplied for supervisory purposes, etc.
Under the statute the minimum paid up capital required for local investors to start a bank has
been set at Sh0.5 billion:  this is equivalent to about $0.5 million, which is relatively low in
comparison to other African countries.  The statute gives the BOU authority to issue statutory
instruments to revise capital requirements, which will enable adjustments to be made to take
account of inflation.  It also specifies minimum ratios for core capital and total capital to risk
adjusted assets of 4 per cent and 8 per cent respectively, along the lines of the Basel Accord
on capital adequacy.
The statute imposes restrictions on insider lending, large credit exposures,16 investment in non
bank business and purchase of real estate.  It also gives the BOU a range of options for
dealing with financial institutions that act imprudently, infringe regulations, or have otherwise
become insolvent.  The BOU can issue cease and desist orders, impose fines on management,
or take over the management of the offending financial institution and re-organise or liquidate
it.
In addition to the legislative changes supervisory capacities at the BOU have been
strengthened.  The Bank Supervision Department has been re-organised into two separate
                    
16 Exposure to a single customer (or group of customers with a common interest), and aggregate lending
to a bank’s own directors, their families and businesses, are both restricted to a maximum of 25 per cent
of core capital.
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departments dealing with banks and other financial institutions, with an advisor taken on,
staff sent abroad for training and new equipment purchased.  The submission of regular
information from financial institutions to the BOU has improved and on site inspections are
being undertaken.
Developments during 1994 and 1995, when the BOU used its powers under the Financial
Institutions Statute to take action against distressed local private sector banks, indicate that
the reforms outlined above have enabled the BOU to adopt a more purposeful approach to
prudential regulation.  Illiquid banks no longer receive automatic overdraft facilities from the
BOU.  In 1994 the BOU took over and closed down the insolvent Tieffe Bank, reimbursing
the depositors.17  The Nile and Sembule banks were taken over in April 1995, with the BOU
suspending their managements and boards of directors and appointing new chief executives.
Restructuring programmes for Nile and Sembule are being implemented entailing the revision
of loan policies and internal controls, upgrading accounting systems and documentation and
measures to recover loans.18  The banks have been given performance targets to recover loans
and raise capital to the minimum levels required under the Financial Institutions Statute.  The
BOU’s take-over of these two banks is indicative of the priority accorded to prudential
concerns, as both have close connections with politics and public administration.  However it
is not yet clear whether public funds will be used to recapitalise any or all of the banks
currently being restructured, and if so, what the cost will be.  Moreover the support provided
by the BOU to depositors of failed banks, either through the restructuring of banks or the
reimbursing of deposits when banks are closed, as with Tieffe, does little to encourage
depositors to be more circumspect about putting their money in the more risky financial
institutions.  It therefore creates moral hazard problems which may facilitate badly managed
financial institutions to attract funds.  There are sound reasons for providing protection to
depositors,19 but the moral hazard involved reinforces the need for effective supervision of
financial institutions.
While the reforms have clearly strengthened prudential regulation in Uganda, two problems
in particular have the potential to impede the BOU’s efforts to ensure that financial
institutions are managed prudently.  First, there may be little that it can effectively do to
ensure that UCB complies with prudential regulations.  The BOU cannot realistically take
over UCB yet alone liquidate it:  it is too big to fail.  Second, the greatest threat to the
                    
17 The Tieffe Bank was small with deposits amounting to only Sh300 million ($300,000).
18 The restructuring of Sembule Bank is being assisted by Banque Belgolaise of Belgium, which has
subsidiaries in other African countries.  It has signed a letter of intent with the BOU to recapitalise
Sembule if its solvency is restored.
19 These include first, enhancing stability in the financial system, by discouraging ’runs’ on deposits when
financial institutions are thought by the public to be in difficulties and second, the protection of small
depositors, many of whom might be regarded as not having sufficient financial expertise to discriminate
between sound and unsound financial institutions.
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solvency of the local banks will be insider lending, which has already caused substantial
distress among local banks.  The new banking legislation imposes much stricter limits on
insider loans, but if their presence in a bank’s portfolio is concealed by fraudulent accounting,
bank examiners may not be able to detect them and take action in time to prevent the bank
becoming distressed.
3.3 FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION
Financial liberalisation in Uganda has so far been relatively limited in both scope and impact,
largely because government intervention in financial markets for allocative purposes was
mediated mainly through its ownership of the largest bank rather than through administrative
controls over private sector institutions.  The latter mainly consisted of interest rate controls,
reform of which commenced in 1992 when some rates were decontrolled and others linked to
the treasury bill rate.  A treasury bill auction was also introduced in 1992, although the market
is very thin.  Interest rates were further liberalised in 1994 when the formal link with treasury
bill rates was removed (Sharer et al. 1995:  34-35).  Liberalisation has also involved
removing some of the restrictions previously imposed on commercial banks’ operations and
asset holdings such as dealing in foreign exchange and treasury bills.
Unlike in a number of other African countries, interest rate liberalisation took place in the
context of a reduction in government domestic borrowing and inflation:  the government
repaid debt to the banking system in 1992/93 and 1993/94 with consumer price inflation
falling from 63 per cent in 1991/92 to 16 per cent in 1993/94 (see Table 4).20  Consequently
liberalisation has enabled positive real lending rates to be achieved without a sharp rise in
nominal interest rates:  lending rates for commerce fell from 41 per cent in December 1991 to
22 per cent in December 1994.21  Both real savings and real time deposit rates were positive
in 1992/93 when inflation fell sharply, although they were negative at the end of the
following year when inflation picked up again.
The attainment of positive real interest rates and low inflation is an advance for the workings
of financial markets.  There are signs that holdings of bank deposits are beginning to recover
from the severe decline that took place in the 1980s.  Bank deposits rose from 4 per cent of
GDP in 1989/90 to 5.8 per cent in 1993/94 (Table 4).  Moreover because nominal interest
rates have not risen sharply, interest rate liberalisation has not led to a major shift in the
composition of banks’ assets from loans to treasury bills, as has occurred elsewhere in Africa.
There was an increase in banks’ holdings of government securities at the expense of loans to
                    
20 Data from Sharer et al. (1995:  7).  The fall in government domestic borrowing came about largely
because foreign borrowing increased, rather than because of a fall in the fiscal deficit.
21 Lending rates are from World Bank (1993:  176) and Bank of Uganda (1994:  52).
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the private sector, but the shift in asset composition was modest.22  However bank credit to
the private sector failed to expand as a percentage of GDP, despite liberalisation and reduced
government domestic borrowing from the banking system as a whole (i.e. the commercial
banks and the BOU).  The most likely reason for this was the reluctance of the foreign banks,
which already had excess liquidity prior to the financial reforms, to lend to new customers
because of the risk involved, while the UCB was constrained by lack of liquidity from
expanding its lending to the private sector.
Despite the improved macroeconomic context for financial reforms in Uganda, liberalising
interest rates is unlikely to have more than a marginal impact on competition and efficiency in
banking markets while the UCB remains in the public sector and retains its virtual monopoly
of most segments of these markets.  What is required to improve allocative efficiency is a
significant expansion in the scale of operations of soundly managed commercially oriented
banks, in sufficient numbers to ensure more than token competition.  The entry of the local
banks (which in most cases preceded financial liberalisation) has injected some competition
into banking markets, but this has mainly been confined to retail banking markets in
Kampala, and further growth in this sector is threatened by the distress afflicting some of the
banks.  The foreign banks have the resources to expand and widen their participation in
Uganda, but have shown little inclination to do so.  Resolving the future role of UCB in a
manner which substantially improves its efficiency, insulates it from political pressures and
reduces its monopoly position is therefore imperative if financial liberalisation is to achieve
its objectives.
4 CONCLUSION
Reforming financial markets to create an efficient, competitive and solvent banking industry
in Uganda is likely to prove a difficult and lengthy enterprise.  The institutional fabric of the
industry was severely damaged during the 1970s and 1980s as a result of misguided financial
policies and the effects of civil war and economic decline.  Financial repression led to large
negative real returns on financial assets and a very steep decline in the financial depth of the
economy.  The government owned UCB expanded into a near monopolistic position in
banking markets while the established foreign banks retrenched to concentrate on a narrow
section of the market.  The UCB provided poor services, incurred a succession of operating
losses, and lost large amounts of money from bad debts.  By the early 1990s it was insolvent
with 75 per cent of its loan portfolio non performing.  Government efforts to use UCB to
channel credit to farmers and other priority sectors on developmental grounds made a major
contribution to UCB’s financial distress.  It also over expanded its branch network and
                    
22 As a percentage of their deposit liabilities to the private sector, commercial bank loans to the private
sector fell from 70 per cent in June 1992 to 62 per cent in June 1994, while holdings of government
securities rose from 6 per cent to 10 per cent (Bank of Uganda 1994:  47).
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staffing levels which raised overheads to excessive levels.  Similar problems afflicted the
Cooperative Bank which was also insolvent in the early 1990s.  Weak prudential regulation
failed to curb the prolonged mismanagement of the public sector banks and also allowed the
emergence of several undercapitalised and imprudently managed local banks in the late
1980s.
The financial reform programme initiated in 1991 contains three major strands:  institutional
reforms, including the restructuring of the UCB and Cooperative Bank, legislative reforms,
and the liberalisation of controls on financial markets, which mainly entails interest rate
deregulation.  The reforms have made progress in terms of several of their objectives.
Prudential regulation has been strengthened, real interest rates have been achieved without a
sharp rise in nominal rates, and a start has been made in restructuring the public sector banks.
But major problems crucial to the success of the reforms have yet to be overcome.
The banking legislation has been revised with the enactment of the 1993 Financial Institutions
Statute.  This has corrected most of the legislative deficiencies in the 1969 Banking Act,
providing the BOU with much greater authority to supervise banks and other financial
institutions and enforce prudential regulations.  The increased emphasis accorded to
prudential regulation has already been demonstrated with the take over by the BOU of three
insolvent local banks in 1993 and 1994.  One of these banks has been closed down and the
other two are being restructured under management appointed by the BOU.  Illiquid banks are
also no longer receiving automatic overdrafts from the BOU, a facility which provided a
major disincentive to discipline in the banking industry in the past.  The local banks can make
a contribution to the development of banking services in Uganda.  They are prepared to lend
to borrowers denied credit by the established banks and often provide better customer
services.  In view of the deficiencies of the established banks it is important that this sector
should be encouraged to develop, but effective supervision is essential to ensure that they are
prudently managed, and not least to prevent them from lending to themselves.
The fall in inflation, which is mainly due to a reduction in government borrowing from the
domestic banking system, has enabled interest rates to be deregulated, and positive real
borrowing rates to be achieved, without forcing nominal interest rates up to levels which
impose high risks on borrowers.  Provided that low inflation can be maintained, the interest
rate reforms should provide a stimulus to a further revival in holdings of bank deposits and
other financial assets by the Ugandan public as well as allowing interest rates to assume a
greater role in allocating credit.
The most important component of the reforms, and the key to how successful they eventually
turn out to be, is the restructuring of UCB.  Because of its dominant position in the banking
industry, the restructuring and future of UCB affect virtually all the objectives of the reform
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programme; competition, efficiency of credit allocation, the quality and availability of
banking services and bank solvency.  The restructuring of the UCB has made some progress,
particularly in terms of reducing its overheads and operating costs, and the bank can be
restored to solvency, albeit at a significant cost to the budget, by replacing its bad debts with
government bonds.  But resolving its future role poses acute dilemmas for the government
because the various different objectives expected of the bank may not be compatible.
Privatisation, to insulate UCB from political pressure to compromise commercial principles,
is probably necessary if it is to avoiding future operating losses and the recurrence of bad
debts.  But much of the rural network may not survive if UCB were privatised (unless the
government were to provide some form of subsidy), leaving large sections of the country
without basic banking services and a payments mechanism.  A privatised bank would also be
very reluctant to continue the UCB’s extensive lending to agriculture, which is the largest
sector of the economy.  Nor is it clear how privatisation of a near monopoly would enhance
competition in banking markets, which would be necessary if efficiency improvements are to
benefit consumers of banking services.
A major obstacle facing the reform programme is that a market oriented solution to the
problems of the banking sector may have only limited efficacy in the economic conditions
currently prevailing in Uganda.  The economy is too underdeveloped, incomes too low and
lending opportunities too few to provide sufficient incentive for private sector banks to
compete for business throughout the country and provide a comprehensive range of banking
services.
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Table 1
Interest Rates and Consumer Price Inflation (%):  1981-90
Year Lending
Rate:
Commerce
Lending Rate:
Agricultural
Development
Time
Deposits
7-12 months
Bank Rate Consumer
Price
Inflation
1981 15.0 13.0 12.0 10.0 109
1982 20.0 14.0 13.0 11.0 49
1983 22.0 18.0 17.0 15.5 24
1984 25.0 24.0 20.0 24.0 43
1985 25.0 24.0 20.0 24.0 157
1986 40.0 38.0 30.0 36.0 161
1987 30.0 25.0 20.0 31.0 200
1988 40.0 35.0 30.0 45.0 196
1989 50.0 40.0 35.0 55.0 61
1990 45.0 36.0 32.0 50.0 33
1991 41.0 37.0 35.0 46.0 28
1992 n/a 26.0@ 32.3 41.0 52
1993 23.0* 25.0* 12.9 24.0 6.2
1994 22.5 22.5 7.0 15.0 9.7
@ March 1993
* March 1994
Bank Rate is the rate at which the BOU lends to commercial banks.
Sources: Interest rates, World Bank (1985:  183 and 1993:  176), Economist Intelligence
Unit Country Profile (1995-96:  23), International Financial Statistics, and Bank of
Uganda (1994:  52); inflation, World Tables.
Table 2
Indicators of Financial Depth:  1970-1990
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
M2/GDP (%) 17.6 20.7 13.7 9.5 7.3
Currency/M2 (%) 35.5 29.3 39.5 40.0 40.8
Bank Deposits/GDP (%) 11.3 14.6 8.2 5.4 4.2
Sources:  International Financial Statistics and Sharer et al. (1995:  32-33).
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Table 3
Commercial Bank Branches in 1991
Bank Number of Branches
Uganda Commercial Bank (g) 190
Cooperative Bank (g) 24
Bank of Baroda (f/g) 6
Barclays Bank (f/g) 5
Libyan Arab Bank (now Tropical Africa Bank) (f/g) 3
Gold Trust Bank (lp) 3
Nile Bank (lp) 2
Standard Chartered Bank (f) 1
Grindlays Bank (now Stanbic) (f/g) 1
Tieffe Bank (lp) 1
Greenland Bank (lp) 1
Total 237
Notes: g - Denotes banks owned by the government.
f/g - Banks with 51 per cent foreign and 49 per cent government equity stakes.
f - Denotes foreign ownership.
lp - Local private sector ownership.
Sources:  Numbers of branches are from Mukwanason (1994:  23).
Table 4
Interest Rates, Prices, Money and Credit:  1989/90-1993/94
Fiscal Year 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93 93/94
Inflation (%) 2.9 32.0 62.9 -0.6 16.1
Savings Deposit Rate (%) 30.0 32.0 21.0 15.0 2.0
Bank Rate (%) 55.0 44.0 49.0 26.0 20.0
M2/GDP (%) 6.8 7.6 7.8 7.8 8.7
Bank Deposits/GDP (%) 4.0 4.5 4.7 5.2 5.8
Domestic Bank Financing of Govt
Deficit/GDP (%)
-1.4 0.2 1.9 -0.4 -0.8
Credit to Private Sector/GDP (%) 5.1 5.9 4.9 4.3 4.6
Figures in this table differ from comparable figures in Table 1 (e.g. inflation) because the
former pertain to fiscal years and the latter calendar years.
Source:  Sharer et al. (1995:  25, 32, 33, 34, 35).
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